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Introduction
Free competition on markets is a major concern in competition policy. A threat to free competition is the cartelization of firms. One major instrument antitrust authorities have and use increasingly frequently are leniency programs. Leniency programs, as a device for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented, or reformed, across countries since the early nineties (i.e. USA 1993 , European Union 1996 . These programs allow for cartel fine avoidance or at least for significant reductions of fines for a cartel member who reports a cartel and should provide incentives to whistle-blowing. Theoretical literature widely analyzed leniency programs, showing that they can be an effective tool to destabilize, detect and deter cartels (Hinloopen 2003 , Motta and Polo 2003 , Spagnolo 2004 , Chen and Harrington 2007 . However, negative effects are possible as well. For instance, an increase in the number of cartels may occur, due to lower expected values of fines, which is a threat to the efficiency of leniency programs (Motta and Polo 2003 , Chen and Harrington 2007 , Harrington 2008 . Empirical literature tries to analyze whether leniency programs are effective but stays inconclusive as identification is only derived from detected cartels (Brenner 2009 , Miller 2009 ). Therefore, it is not clear whether a possible success of a leniency program that is indicated by more uncovered cartels is due to more efficient cartel prosecution or due to more existent cartels. 1 This paper attempts to go a step further in the identification of effectiveness of leniency programs. First, I argue that the efficiency of leniency programs can be derived empirically by analyzing its direct impact on competition intensity. Competition intensity is an appropriate measure of success of the effectiveness of leniency programs, because the ultimate goal of leniency programs is to deter collusion and cartels that are supposed to lower competition intensity. Secondly, I apply a widely used measure for competition intensity and show empirically that leniency programs in place lead to increased competition intensity and are therefore an effective tool for destroying or avoiding cartels. In executing these two steps, this paper adds empirical evidence to the literature regarding the effectiveness of leniency programs.
The analysis relies on the theoretical literature and identifies the main objective of leniency programs, to increase, or at least to sustain, the level of competition. To check the hypothesis of leniency programs' effectiveness, the empirical analysis uses the OECD Structural Analysis Database (STAN), which provides information on industry level characteristics. This data allows to build a measure of the average profitability of industries, which is an increasing function of the price cost margin (PCM) that is used as a measure of competition intensity at the industry level. The analysis therefore relates to the literature that analyzes effectiveness of competition enhancing policies by using the same measure as, however, an endogenous variable (Griffith et al. 2007 , Griffith et al. 2010 or as a control variable (Buccirossi et al. 2009 , Aghion et al. 2009 ). In conjunction with supplementary data of antitrust agencies and various other OECD statistics, an unbalanced panel comprising 23 countries over a period of 20 years is built. Besides the information that is necessary to construct the PCM equivalent measure, it includes a great deal of other relevant information, which allows to control for competition intensity. Supplementary information is added from other OECD databases. In addition, data to control for policies that may have an effect on the competition intensity is used as well.
Identification follows an approach similarly proposed by Buccirossi et al. (2009) in order to take account of the two main sources of bias: endogeneity and omitted variable bias. First, I
control for several side factors, which have an impact on competition intensity such as imports, business cycles, product market regulation as well as competition affecting policies. Secondly, an instrumental variable approach using different sets of instruments to test for endogeneity and omitted variable bias is applied. In particular, I use the implementation of leniency programs on the OECD level as well as indicators for the political environment provided by the Manifesto database (Klingemann et al. 2006 ). These different instruments allow to build an appropriate predictor for the application of leniency programs and offer the opportunity for consistency tests. Thirdly, to check for robustness, I provide several tests controlling for the impact of the European supranational leniency programs, temporal persistence of leniency programs and for the specific legal system in which leniency programs are used.
The results indicate a positive impact of leniency programs on competition intensity, with an approximate decrease of the PCM of 3% to 5%. Moreover, the instrumental variable estimation reveals that these results do not suffer from significant endogeneity or omitted variable bias.
Thus, national leniency programs can be denoted to work efficiently in detecting and deterring cartels. This result is in line with previous findings, deriving identification from discovered cartels only. Robustness checks show that the impact of leniency programs takes on average a period of one year to become effective. In addition, I can show that leniency programs are dependent on the legal environment where they are implemented. As a side finding, estimations cannot verify a robust impact of the European supranational leniency programs. Finally, the overall analysis shows that efficiency of antitrust programs in general may potentially be appropriately estimated using competition intensity as a success measure.
The outline of the paper is the following: Section 2 provides a background discussion and derives the hypothesis. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy, section 4 discusses the data and provides descriptive statistics. Section 5 provides empirical results, and section 6 concludes.
Literature Review and Background Discussion
Leniency programs in antitrust have formally been existent since 1978, when they were implemented in the US. However, they were hardly used before a major revision by the US Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in 1993 that allowed for fine avoidance in case of a cartel reporting (OECD 2002) . The revision's large success in the detection of cartels led several other countries to install similar programs (i.e. EU, UK, Korea, New Zealand). In particular, the EU implemented a program in 1996 which was substantially revised in 2002.
Analyzing the effectiveness of those programs requires to define the objectives first. The primary objective of leniency programs, as of antitrust laws in general, is to deter cartels or harmful behavior (Spagnolo 2008) . This primary objective can be separated into two parts: Ex ante or general deterrence and ex post deterrence or desistance. In other words, these two derived objectives imply prevention of cartels either before they occur or prosecution due to the detection of already existing cartels. 2
Theoretical literature provides evidence that leniency programs can be an effective tool to deter cartels and therefore can be effective in achieving the primary objective. For instance, Spagnolo (2004) identifies in a static model conditions for an efficient setup of leniency programs. In particular, a program which grants exclusive reductions of fines to the first confessor only, is identified to have the strongest deterrence effect. He finds those effects as well, albeit smaller, in less strict programs, where second or third parties reporting a cartel receive some reductions in sanctions as well. The analysis from Aubert et al. (2006) focuses on the incentives of rewards and fines. These rewards are granted additionally on top of the leniency. Aubert et al. (2006) show that reduced fines can have a positive impact on deterrence, but that programs offering rewards, especially if individuals are included, may have an even larger impact. Motta and Polo (2003) introduce a welfare maximizing antitrust authority, endogenizing the process of detection.
In particular, they consider the effects of leniency programs of firms on their incentives either on collusion (ex-ante) or revealing information after collusion took place (ex-post). They show that leniency programs may well enhance the ex-post detection and therefore desistence but may have pro-collusive effects as expected fines may decrease. Therefore, a negative effect on deterrence may be possible such that a leniency program leads to an increase in cartels. In a different setting, Chen and Harrington (2007) provide an analysis using a dynamic model. They conclude that a strong leniency program has significant deterrence effects, but softer leniency programs may have adverse effects on deterrence. This is in line with Motta and Polo (2003) .
In addition, they identify a lower price in the overall pricing of cartels due to leniency programs even if no deterrence effects are identified.
These ambiguous pro-collusive effects and anti-collusive deterrence effects are explained and considered in a theoretical analysis by Harrington (2008) by three main channels. First, the Deviator Amnesty Effect changes the pay-off of a firm when cheating in a cartel and lowers the expected utility a firm has of collusion, indicating positive effects on deterrence. Secondly, the Cartel Amnesty Effect, however, lowers the expected size of the sanctions such that the expected utility a firm has due to collusion may increase, implying less cartels than in an environment without leniency. The third effect is the Race to the Courthouse Effect. This effect may lower expected values from colluding if less stricter programs, which offers some leniency to more than the first confessor, are in place. This effect implies less collusion. In particular, the Race to the Courthouse Effect is claimed to be a countervailing force for the Cartel Amnesty Effect.
Finally, concluding that theoretical literature provides strong evidence that leniency programs may reduce cartel stability, Harrington (2008) mentions that strong empirical evidence is missing, in particular due to data restrictions only on detected cartels.
There are empirical studies considering whether there has been an increase in cartel detection and deterrence due to leniency programs. Brenner (2009) there was an increase of cartel detection in the US, which decreased later onto a level that was below the pre-leniency detection level. This decrease is interpreted with higher cartel deterrence.
His analysis relies on hypotheses derived from a theoretical dynamic model and an empirical analysis using cartel detection to derive inference. Moreover, his predictions rely on a single time series and on the representability of detected cartels. The study by Miller is a large step in providing substantial evidence that leniency programs lead to more deterrence and less collusion.
However, a final conclusion is still missing, since the identification is only derived by data from detected cartels.
Measures like detected cartels are easily available, but this measure should be analyzed with caution. It may capture success, such as cartel detection, but this could be the result of more existent cartels. Moreover, a reduction in cartel detection, which may reflect less overall cartel activity could be interpreted as a failure of leniency programs. Clearly, data on undetected cartels is not available. This is due to the fact that cartels are per se illegal and not observable (Spagnolo 2008) . I propose to solve this measurement problem by implementing a different, more direct measure of success. In particular, an effective leniency program leads to a situation with less cartels after the implementation of such a program. If we expect that cartels lead to a less competitive outcome (for example collusive outcome vs. oligopoly outcome), the counterfactual hypothesis for a test of effectiveness of leniency programs should be whether there is a more competitive environment after the implementation of a leniency program. Therefore, effectiveness of cartels can be analyzed by investigating the intensity of competition in possibly cartelized industries. If, ceteris paribus, competition intensity increases due to the implementation of leniency programs, a leniency program is effective.
Empirical Strategy

Empirical Modeling
The objective of this study is to analyze whether leniency programs can deter and destroy cartels to improve the competitive situation in industries across OECD countries. The central relationship I want to estimate is captured in the following form:
with Y as a measure of the industries' competition intensity, 3 Leniency as an indicator whether a Leniency program is in place, P olicies as a vector of other competition affecting policies, X as a vector of other control variables 4 and as the error term. The error term is defined as i,t = ω i,t + φ i,t + u i,t , with ω i,t capturing time dummies, φ i,t country-industry specific fixed effects and u i,t the remaining error. In particular, I estimate the impact of leniency programs on the competition intensity to measure the success more directly than previous studies did.
They measured the success of leniency programs indirectly using data on detected cartels only.
A positive competition enhancing effect of leniency programs is denoted to be an indicator for more destroyed cartels (either detected or deterred).
Identification
Identification of the efficiency of implemented leniency programs is analyzed by evaluating the impact leniency programs have on competition intensity. Successful leniency programs should ultimately deter competition-harming behavior that reduces overall welfare. As pointed out before, cartels, by definition, try to cooperate in order to reduce competition to increase prices and profits of cartel members. If, ceteris paribus, cartels are deterred, a non-cooperative market outcome that is subject to more competition will arise. Therefore, instead of identifying deterred cartels (ex-ante or ex-post), which is impossible for ex-ante deterred cartels and for non-detected destabilized cartels, the analysis relies on the effect on the final goal of leniency programs, the increase of competition intensity. 5 I consider several potential biases to identify a causal link between leniency programs and competition intensity in the estimation. For the estimation strategy, I follow similar steps and use similar controls as Buccirossi et al. (2009) . 6 I try to eliminate endogeneity bias either resulting from two-way causality or omitted variable bias. Two-way causality, however, is less of a concern, as single, possibly collusive, industries are probably not responsible for an implementation of a leniency program. Implementation of such policy programs take a rather long time, as the design of laws is slow and requires effort. However, to reduce possible bias, lagged values of the leniency indicator variable are used. 7 Assuming that lagged values of the leniency variable are uncorrelated with the error term of the estimated equation (Buccirossi et al. 2009, Griffith and Harrison 2004) should consider two-way causality sufficiently.
Omitted variable bias is a significant concern as there are a lot of factors having an impact on the competition intensity of an industry. The time invariant factors are captured using industrycountry specific fixed effects. Time invariant biases are partially tackled, introducing relevant controls. In particular, I control for foreign competition, business cycles, product market regulation and relevant policy programs. 8 Moreover, to reduce bias from omitted variables, I use an instrumental variable estimation to explicitly test for potential endogeneity. The instrument is the implementation of leniency programs in other OECD countries. While there is a correlation between implementing leniency programs in the different OECD countries, there is no impact of the competition intensity in one country on the implementation of leniency program in another one. This correlation in the implementation is especially given due the cooperation on competition policies across OECD countries. To check robustness, I add other kinds of instruments, also proposed by Buccirossi et al. (2009) . These instruments are indicators of the political position of the program of political parties which are elected into parliament. These indicators are provided by the Manifesto data (Klingemann et al. 2006 ). In particular, I control for countries' political parties' programs regarding tendency for the role of governments' economic planning (market regulation, controlling economy, economic planning) and the size and importance of a country's welfare state (social justice, welfare state expansion, welfare state limitation). Both sets of instruments should have explanatory power for the application of leniency programs, however, the latter ones are more certainly exogenous to competition intensity, while the first is potentially reversely affected by the intensity of competition.
In addition, I control for non-linearities of leniency programs, depending on the legal environment in which they are applied (see Buccirossi et al. 2009 , La Porta et al. 2008 . Leniency programs are interacted with different legal systems and it is checked whether there are dependencies.
This part of the analysis uses a pooled OLS approach and country industry dummies instead of fixed effects, as the legal system is a time invariant factor that cannot be estimated using fixed effects.
Data & Descriptive Statistics
The data is composed of several data sources. The main source is the OECD Structural Analysis Database (STAN), which provides data on the industry level, of which I use information on the two digit NACE classification level. The data contains information on manufacturing industries as well as service industries. 9 In includes in particular various information about value added, exports, imports and capital formation. The data is complemented with information on leniency programs in place, provided by national antitrust authorities. Furthermore, information on interest rates, inflation and product market regulation from the OECD Reference Series, the OECD Key Economic Indicators database and the OECD Product Market Regulation database, is added. Information of relevant policy programs that is publicly available is added as well.
Competition Intensity
The dependent variable of interest to identify the efficiency of leniency programs is competition intensity. To measure this intensity of competition within an industry, I use a measure of average profitability. This is equivalent to the price cost margin (PCM) given the assumption of constant economies of scale and marginal costs equal to average costs. 10 Deviations lead, therefore, to under-or over-estimations. Although this drawback is existent, Griffith et al. (2010) claim that the PCM is certainly the best measure available for an international comparison of several countries in an international database. Lamentably, as Boone (2008a Boone ( , 2008b points out, the PCM is not robust to all industry constellations, especially if there is a reorganization of the industry due to tighter competition. He shows that tighter competition leads to shifts of production from less efficient to more efficient firms. These shifts in production may lead to a non-linear relationship between the PCM and competition intensity. However, in this particular analysis, the drawback is not an issue, because the interest lies in a change in the measure due to cartels deterrence or destruction. The reference point is a collusive outcome, indicating maximization of profits. If a firm deviates and destroys the cartel (or the cartel is detected by the antitrust authority), this will decrease overall industry profits, regardless of possible industry reorganization. Therefore, a reduction of the average profitability measure indicates destroyed cartels. 11
The PCM equivalent measure, average profitability, is calculated by an industry's value added, divided by the sum of industry's capital costs and industry's labor costs:
While there is information about value added and labor costs in the STAN data, capital costs are not included in the data. 12 To create an approximation for capital costs, the gross fixed capital is multiplied with a capital cost factor. This capital cost factor is equal to a risk-free interest rate plus the industries' average capital depreciation less the countries' inflation. & Griffith et al. (2010) . In the following I use the terms average profitability and PCM synonymously.
11 If the effect of the leniency programs on PCM is positive, this indicates that there will be more cartels.
12 All values are computed using nominal prices. 13 This measure has been similarly used by Griffith et al. (2010) , Griffith et al. (2007) and Martins et al. (1996) 9 and calculate the average capital consumption over capital employed. effects. The reasoning behind is that there may be cartels across borders. This is even more the case in European countries, which have strong interrelated economies, but applies also to other countries. Therefore, there may be effects of cartels detected or deterred in neighbor countries.
To control for possible endogeneity, two kind of instruments for an instrumental variable estimation are constructed. First, the instrument provided is the percentage of other OECD countries having implemented a leniency program. 18 Due to international cooperation regarding antitrust policies, I suppose that the probability using a leniency program is increasing in the programs, implemented in other countries. Second, I use a set of political variables constructed from the 14 This data is only available for a small subset of countries of rather different size. To have an appropriate rate not biased by small economies, I use the largest economy available for the data, which is Germany. Only for industries not available in German data, I use the average of all industries available.
15 As the use of the perpetual inventory method always yields to volatile capital measures depending on the specific assumptions, all calculations are checked for whether the calculated capital measure influences results significantly. Results are consistent if gross fixed capital, as provided in the data, is used. The perpetual inventory method is also used similarly by Griffith et al. (2010) , Griffith et al. (2007) and Buccirossi et al. (2009) .
16 Information is available at http//ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/model leniency programme annex1.pdf. For the UK, I used the introduction of the legal basis for the leniency program rather than the last revisions.
17 In particular, the leniency program of 1996 did not ensure full amnesty while the revision in 2002 added this important point. 18 The country for which the variable is observed is excluded inside the construction of this variable.
Manifesto data (Klingemann et al. 2006) . This data provides information on a country's elected political parties' position within their corresponding electoral program regarding different categories. In general, the positions of the parties are described as the percentages of quasi-sentences in which a position is mentioned in the overall program. To construct a measure for a country, this information is weighted with the voters of the parties of a country in the last election. 19
The This variable, however, is a compound variable containing information on the political parties' position regarding market regulation, which may be subject to changes in a country's general competition intensity. Therefore, this variable is only valid as a robustness check. 22
Further Control Variables
Several different variables are taken from the STAN database to control for variation in competition intensity. The measure used for competition intensity, the average profitability, is influenced strongly by business cycles. To control for this source of variation, I take into account national GDP taken from the OECD Reference Series. 23 First, I estimate the linear and quadratic trend in time and, secondly, use deviations from this trend, which indicate whether the business cycle is either on the upper or lower part of the trend.
An important indicator for openness of an industry is import. The STAN data provides information on this. First, absolute values of imports in an industry and secondly, import penetration, 19 Other scholars, Buccirossi et al. (2009) in particular, use only the government's parties position, but I assume that even though the government parties can theoretically implement their position, they will consider, at least partially, what voters consider as favorable policies, because they also seek those voters which did not vote for them before. The 2006 data is enriched with the updates available at the Manifesto's project homepage. In addition, I assumed, for missing values, that a new parliament is in place for at least two years. However, all results are robust to not imposing this assumption.
20 Welfare is a compound variable of the items Social Justice and Welfare State Expansion. 21 Planned Economy is a compound variable of the items Market Regulation, Economic Planning and Controlled Economy.
22 If the direct item Market Regulation is used alone, over identification tests fail in the IV estimation. The compound variable, however, seems to be a valid instrument as the potential reverse causality is limited due to the other factors.
23 All continuous variables are measured in Billion units of national currency.
as imports divided by the overall value added, are used. Even though the import penetration is seemingly more informative, it reflects changes in both value added and imports. To capture only changes in imports, I also add the absolute value as a control variable.
Regulation of markets harm free entry and competition in markets. To control for country specific intensity on product market regulation (PMR), I use, as in Buccirossi et al. (2009) 
Relevant for the competition intensity in the EU, I control for the EU east enlargement in 2004.
A dummy variable is created for the EU member states to take account of this structural break, which should have an effect on competition in European Markets. Moreover, I add a dummy for the new member states, because they should be affected stronger by the EU entrance than the former European Members.
To control for non-linearities introduced by legal aspects, I use, as in Buccirossi et al. (2009) , controls for the legal system and construct interactions between the legal system and the leniency program variable. The classification of legal systems follows La Porta et al. (2008) and subdivides legal systems into those of English, French, German and Scandinavian origin. The intuition behind this is that legal instruments, as the leniency program, depend systematically on the underlying legal system. Therefore, this variable allows to capture some of the general, underlying mechanisms important for the efficiency of leniency programs. Some OECD countries are missing in the estimation due to missing data (i.e. Australia, Slovak Republic). Table 3 contains the industries used for estimations and shows clearly a dominance of the manufacturing industries. This dominance is due to data availability and missing values for service sectors. Table 4 shows the main variables for one of the largest estimation samples. The average profitability has the size of 1.23 but a rather large standard deviation. It has to be noted that data shows, as in Griffith et al. (2010) , an increasing tendency of the average profitability/PCM over time. 25 This upward trend is not a significant problem as I am interested in differentials.
Descriptive Statistics
Moreover, due to its upward trend, it is possible that there is an underestimation of the possibly negative impact of leniency programs on the PCM. In 29 % of the observations, 26 a national leniency program is installed. Moreover, 56% are subject to the first EU leniency program and 31% to its revision. The OECD PMR index has an average size of 1.81. 66% of the observations are treated by the European Single Market Program, which indicates that the data consists mostly of EU member states. This can also be seen in the percentage of observations treated by the EU enlargement in 2004, which is around 21%. Table 5 provides basic estimations analyzing the impact of leniency programs on competition intensity. Column (1) shows as a baseline a pooled OLS estimation, but a significant effect of leniency programs on the PCM cannot be revealed. As this may be due to time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity, column (2) error: 0.0202) as well as the validity of instruments. Taking these results into account, the relationship between leniency program implementation and the PCM can be neither denoted to be endogenous nor can it be denoted to face significant omitted variable bias, allowing a causal interpretation of the preferable OLS coefficients. 27 As a side finding, the estimations show that in the first column, the revision of the European supranational leniency program is significant but becomes insignificant afterwards. This may be explained by the imprecision of the estimates in the first column, which indicate a non significant impact of these programs. Table 8 analyzes the importance of time lags regarding the measurement of leniency programs.
Empirical Analysis
This is an important test to check whether the impact of leniency programs is observable only 27 The variable Planned Economy is not significant in the first stage if it is used together with the other political variables, however, it is significant without using them, indicating predictive power as an instrument. This specification is still informative as it helps to test overall validity of the instruments using the Sargan over-identification test.
in one period or persistently over time. Estimations use the full set of variables. In columns (1) to (6), the leniency program variable is used first with no time lags and then increased up to 5 years of time lag. The impact on the PCM is negative and significant for the one year lag, but seems to be stronger the more time lags are used. Results suggest that it takes a while, up to one periods after implementation, until the leniency programs are becoming effective. This is interesting as it shows that a learning time is necessary until firms react to the new program.
The effectiveness of leniency programs depends on a variety of specific conditions. One condition which has a rather strong effect is the legal environment in which a leniency program is in place. Table 9 analyzes the dependency of the legal system. As the underlying legal system is time invariant, pooled OLS estimations are used. Column (1) introduces controls for the legal system.
As the baseline, I use the French legal system. It can be seen that on average, profits are lower in countries with the English and Scandinavian legal system and especially in countries with German legal systems. As in the first regression table, the pooled OLS can identify a negative, but not significant value for the national leniency program. Column (2) introduces an interaction term between the legal system with leniency programs. Results show that the impact of leniency programs is still negative and becomes significant now. However, interaction effects indicate different efficiency of leniency variables within the different legal systems. They seem to be less efficient especially in countries with English or Scandinavian legal systems. Even though it is not clear how efficient the pooled OLS estimation is, it seems to be clear that the institutional factors are important. Columns (3) and (4) add additional control variables. In column (3), the overall leniency effect gets smaller, which applies also for column (4). The patterns regarding the interaction effects stay the same. They seem to be more efficient in countries with German and French legal systems. These results indicate that leniency programs are actually not effective by themselves, but dependent on the environment where they are implemented.
Conclusions
This study proposed to infer efficiency of leniency programs by using the PCM as a measure of competition intensity. I argued that an increasing competition intensity indicates that leniency programs destroy cartels (either due to detection or deterrence). Empirical analysis shows that leniency programs have a robust and throughout negative impact on the PCM, which is approximately between 3 % and 5 %. This implies a positive impact on the competitive environment at the industry level. The study does not directly investigate whether this impact is due to detection of cartels or due to deterrence of cartels, but as the number of detected cartels is presumably not large enough to have an impact on a too large number of industries, 16 this study provides evidence that cartels are destabilized and deterred. This paper takes account of various relevant issues that may bias this finding. In the analysis, an instrumental variable approach is used to tackle the most important identification problems', omitted variable bias and endogeneity. All results are robust to various instruments and finally, no proof of endogeneity can be provided. This leads to clear support of the provided OLS estimations and backs the found evidence for effectiveness of leniency programs in the OECD countries, indicating a causal impact of leniency programs on competition intensity. This study therefore complements the previous studies on this topic, tackling, however, their main drawback of incomplete identification based on detected cartels only.
Beside this main finding, the study provides some further interesting results. I was able to show that the effect of leniency on competition intensity becomes significant one year after the implementation and increases over time. This indicates that leniency programs need some time before beoming effective. As an additional result, it can be stated that the underlying legal system in which those leniency programs can be found seem to have an important impact.
Regressions indicate some correlations that may be interesting for further research on detailed conditions of leniency programs to work appropriately. As a side finding, correlations between the supranational EU leniency programs and competition intensity can be found, however, these correlations are not robust when controlling for other sources of variation in the competition intensity. Robust Standard errors are in brackets, Column 1's clustered in year-country dimension Significant at 1% ***, significant at 5 % ** , significant at 10% * 
